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iV

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Joseph Blake Scovill appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon the jury

verdict ﬁnding

Statement

him

Of The

guilty of felony battery against a health care worker.

Facts

And Course Of The Proceedings

In October 2017,

Van

Scovill took his son Joseph Scovill t0 the Eastern Idaho Regional

Medical Center (“EIRMC”) in Idaho Falls for a psychiatric evaluation.

was working

at the

reception desk in the

EIRMC

arrived. (Trial Tr., p.103, Ls.12-24; p.106, L.11

emergency room

— p.107,

(R., p.24.)

at the

to Scovill’s

p.108, L.2

—

p.168, L.20

p.106, Ls.17-24.)

security.

(Trial Tr.,

Sage Albright and Garren Kelly — both law enforcement ofﬁcers

were working off-duty as security for the hospital — responded to the scene.

— p.128, L20;

time Joseph Scovill

Tr.,

demeanor, Barnes signaled another employee t0 contact

p.1 10, L.5.)

Kara Barnes

L.13.) Scovill “aggressively” pulled the

doors open, “began tossing things around,” and “ﬂipped off’ Barnes. (Trial

Due

trial

(Trial

TL,

p. 126,

Who
L.11

— p.174, L24.)

Albright would later testify at the jury

trial that

upon reporting

t0 the scene,

Scovill appeared agitated and had “clenched fists.” (Trial Tr., p. 1 74, L.25

and Kelly followed Scovill

to the reception desk.

— p.175,

(Trial Tr., p.176, Ls.4-1

1 .)

he saw that

L. 1 6.) Albright

There, Scovill took

off his jacket, put his hands up, and appeared t0 Albright t0 be “posturing for a ﬁght.” (Trial T11,
p.176, Ls. 12-17.)

After some discussion between Albright and Scovill, Albright and Kelly

followed Scovill out of the emergency room area. (Trial

Tr.,

p.176, L.18

— p.178,

L.2.) Albright

attempted t0 converse with Scovill again outside, but Scovill was ﬂailing his arms and “acting

kind of uncontrollable” before again posturing like he wanted t0 ﬁght. (Trial
p.179, L.21.)

L.1

1.)

Scovill then ran back into the

emergency room.

— p.181,

Albright followed. (Trial Tr., p.180, L.3

As

was going

to try t0

wrapped Scovill up and took him

—

p.180,

hand

left

and

in a ﬁst

(Trial Tr., p.181, Ls.5-9.)

(Trial Tr., p.181, Ls.10-12.)

Scovill

Albright

t0 the ground. (Trial Tr., p.181, Ls.10-16.) There, Albright felt

Scovill swinging at his face and connecting with his shoulders and torso. (Trial TL, p. 1 81, L.23

p.182, L.2.)

entered the

room and grabbed

Shortly after Albright and Scovill went t0 the ground, Kelly

Scovill’s legs.

Albright and Kelly

(Trial Tr., p.183, Ls.18—22.)

ultimately got Scovill under control and into handcuffs. (Trial Tr., p.183, L.23
the encounter, Albright sustained an abrasion

Ls.15-25.)

room

A Video

reception desk

0n

his jawline caused

by

Scovill.

— p.184,

L.6.)

In

(Trial Tr., p.184,

0f the portions 0f the incident that took place in the area 0f the emergency

was admitted

into evidence.

This Video includes the physical confrontation

1, 9:

—

Albright punched Scovill approximately three times in order to attempt to gain

(Trial Tr., p.183, Ls.8-17.)

control.

—

L.4.)

punch him.

then “hit [Albright] in the chest with his upper torso.”

p.178, L.20

(Trial Tr., p.179, L.22

Albright entered the emergency room, he saw Scovill raise his

spin towards Albright like he

Tr.,

(Trial Tr., p.187, Ls.18-22; State’s exhibit 1.)

at the

door of the emergency room. (State’s exhibit

10 — 9:33.) The state charged Scovill With battery against a health care worker, a felony. (R.,

pp.69-70.)

Prior t0

evidence

at trial

trial,

the state ﬁled a motion in limine t0 exclude Scovill

regarding his “mental illness, diagnosis, 0r condition.”

from presenting any

(R.,

pp.122-124.)

The

state

argued that such evidence was precluded by LC. § 18-207(1), and that the provision of that

statute (LC. § 18-207(3)), permitting expert

evidence “0n the issue of any state 0f mind Which

an element 0f the offense,” did not apply in

this case

because Scovill was charged With a general

intent crime. (Id.) After a hearing (3/28/ 1 8 TL), the district court granted the

138).

The court excluded:

(1)

else as t0 the circumstances

transported to the emergency room,” because such evidence

During the

trial,

Scovill

made

among

(R.,

pp.134-

— p.198,

was not

by Which

[Scovill]

(2)

was

relevant. (R., pp.134-138.)

several motions pursuant t0 I.C.R. 16(b)(6) asserting that the

prosecutor failed to disclose statements
p.196, Ls.20-25; p.197, L.24

motion

“Medical records or medical history of [Scovill]”; and

“Testimony from [Van Scovill] 0r anyone

is

made

t0 her

by Sage

L.1; p.218, L.9

Albright. (Trial TL, p.162, Ls.8-18;

— p.219,

L.1.) Speciﬁcally, Scovill asserted,

other things, that the prosecutor failed t0 disclose Albright’s statement (Trial Tr., p.181,

Ls.10-12) that Scovill “hit [Albright] in the chest with his upper torso.” (Trial
25; p.197, L.24

— p.198,

L.1).

proven by the combined

Tr.,

p.196, Ls.20-

Scovill appeared to assert that this alleged discovery Violation

was

facts that Albright did not describe this particular contact during the

preliminary hearing, and Albright’s testimony that he had met with the prosecutor after the
preliminary hearing.

(Trial Tr., p.196, Ls.20-25; p.197,

L.24 — p.198, L.1.)

agreed that there were differences between Albright’s preliminary hearing and
this point,

but declined t0 impose any sanction 0r expressly

p.198, Ls.2—20.)

ﬁnd

The

district court

trial

testimony 0n

a discovery Violation. (Trial Tr.,

At
The

the jury found Scovill guilty as charged.

(R.,

pp.190-191.)

imposed probation and granted Scovill a withheld judgment.

(R.,

pp.192-196.)

the conclusion of the

district court

trial,

Scovill timely appealed. (R., pp. 1 97-20 1 2 1 0-2 1 6.)
,

ISSUES
Scovill states the issues

1.

Did the

0n appeal

district court

as:

abuse

its

discretion

by precluding Mr.

Scovill

from

presenting evidence of his mental state at the time of the alleged incident?

2.

Did

the district court abuse

its

discretion

by

failing t0 strike

Mr. Albright’s

testimony that Mr. Scovill made contact With him before he took Mr. Scovill
to the ground, as a sanction for the State’s failure to disclose this assertion

prior t0 trial?

3.

Did

the accumulation 0f errors, even if individually harmless, deprive Mr.

Scovill of his Fourteenth

Amendment right t0

a fair trial?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 1 8.)

1.

The

state rephrases the issues as:

Has

Scovill failed t0 demonstrate that the district court abused

its

discretion

by granting

the state’s motion in limine t0 exclude certain evidence of Scovill’s mental state?

2.

Has

Scovill failed t0 demonstrate either that the prosecutor violated I.C.R. 16(b)(6), or that

the district court abused

3.

Has

its

discretion by denying his request t0 strike Albright’s testimony?

Scovill failed t0 demonstrate error to cumulate?

ARGUMENT
I.

Has Failed T0 Demonstrate That The District Court Abused Its Discretion BV Granting
The State’s Motion In Limine To Exclude Certain Evidence Of Scovill’s Mental State

Scovill

A.

Introduction

Scovill contends that the district court abused

its

by granting

discretion

in limine

and precluding him from presenting evidence of his mental

incident.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.19-24.)

Scovill has failed t0

show

the state’s motion

state at the

time of the

that the district court erred

because he has failed t0 demonstrate that any proffered evidence of his mental

state

tended t0

disprove the general intent of battery.

B.

Standard

Of Review

Relevance

is

a question of law reviewed de nova. State

P.3d 77, 91 (Ct. App. 2011); State

V.

V.

Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 190, 254

Kralovec, 161 Idaho 569, 574, 388 P.3d 583, 588 (2017).

However, the admissibility 0f evidence

is

a discretionary determination that Will be disturbed on

appeal only where the district court abuses that discretion.1 State

V.

Godwin, 164 Idaho 903, 918,

436 P.3d 1252, 1267 (2019).
In evaluating Whether a lower court abused

four—part inquiry,

which asks “whether the

discretion, the appellate court conducts a

trial court: (1)

discretion; (2) acted Within the outer boundaries

1

its

correctly perceived the issue as one 0f

of its discretion;

(3) acted consistently

With the

In this case, the district court appeared t0 apply both LC. § 18-207 and general relevance
principles in excluding evidence of Scovill’s mental state.

legal standards applicable to the speciﬁc choices available t0

exercise of reason.”

Lunneborg

C.

V.

The

State V. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 272,

MV Fun Life,

District

Evidence

(4)

reached

its

decision

429 P.3d 149, 160 (2018)

by the
(citing

163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).

Court Correctly Granted The State’s Motion In Limine To Exclude Certain

Of Scovill’s Mental

Idaho Code

and

it;

§

State

18-207(1) provides that a defendant’s “[m]ental condition shall not be a

defense t0 any charge of criminal conduct.” Idaho

Code

§ 18-207(3) provides that this restriction

does not “prevent the admission 0f expert evidence on the issue of any state of mind Which

is

an

deﬁned relevant evidence

as

element of the offense, subject t0 the rules 0f evidence.”

At

the time of Scovill’s

trial,

“evidence having any tendency t0

the Idaho evidentiary rules

make

the existence 0f

any

determination of the action more probable 0r less probable than
I.R.E.

fact that is

0f consequence t0 the

would be Without the evidence.”

it

401 (2017).

The crime 0f battery
force 0r Violence

strikes another

harm t0 an

is

committed When a person

upon the person 0f another;

LC.

§ 18—903. In the

(a) willfully

(b) actually, intentionally,

person against the will 0f another; or

individual.

either:

(c)

and unlawfully uses

and unlawfully touches or

unlawfully and intentionally causes bodily

present case, the jury

was

instructed consistently with

and Scovill was not charged under any particular sub-section of LC.

this statutory deﬁnition,

§ 18-

903.2 (Augmentation3, p.16; R., pp.69-70.)

Battery

a general intent crime because none 0f the sub-sections 0f LC. § 18-903 require

is

Code

a speciﬁc intent beyond doing the prohibited act willfully 0r intentionally. Idaho

provides that the

as in

LC.

word “Willﬁllly,” When applied to the

§ 18-903(a), implies

omission referred

t0. It

any advantage.”

E

“intentionally.”

it

that,

“[a]lthough

54 P.3d 470, 472-473

it is

cause bodily injury,

mind

for

done or omitted,

not necessary that the defendant

it is

The

act.”

(Ct.

App. 2000);

App. 2002) (discussing LC.

know that the

act is

necessary that the defendant intend a forceful 0r

Code

§

18-903(b) and

(c)

provide that the requisite

is

This intent “is not an intent to commit a crime, but

internal quotation omitted).

Scovill

(Ct.

committing those categories of battery

knowingly perform the interdicted

2

79

also State V. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 401, 3 P.3d 67,

Violent contact With the other person”) Idaho

culpable state of

act is

does not require any intent to Violate law, or to injure another, 0r t0 acquire

and stating

illegal or intend that

Which an

“simply a purpose 0r Willingness t0 commit the act or make the

State V. Billings, 137 Idaho 827, 829-830,

§ 18-903(a)

intent with

§ 18- 1 0 1 (1)

Mg; 137

Idaho

at 830,

that the acts are

done

merely the intent

is

54 P.3d

at

473

(citations

t0

and

“interdicted act[s]” of LC. § 18-903 (b) and (c) “are, respectively,

was charged With felony battery against a health care worker, LC.

requires the state to prove that the battery

is

§

18-9 1 5C. This statute

committed against a health care worker, but expressly

adopts I.C. § 18-903’8 deﬁnition of “battery.”
3

The Idaho Supreme Court granted

instructions. (10/1/19 Order.)

Scovill’s

motion

t0

augment the appellate record With the jury

‘touching or striking of another person against the will of the other’ and ‘causing bodily

an individual.”

harm

to

Li.

In this case, prior to

trial,

the state ﬁled a motion in limine to preclude Scovill from

presenting any evidence regarding his “mental illness, diagnosis, or condition” at the

trial.

(R.,

pp.122-124.) The state argued that such evidence was precluded by I.C. § 18-2070), and that the
provision 0f that statute (LC. § 18-207(3)), permitting evidence “0n the issue 0f any state 0f mind

which

is

an element 0f the offense” did not apply in

this case

because Scovill was charged with a

general intent crime. (Id.)

After a hearing (3/28/18 TL), the district court granted the state’s motion.

The court excluded:

138.)

(1)

“Medical records 0r medical history of

“Testimony from [Van Scovill] or anyone

else as t0 the circumstances

transported to the emergency room,” because such evidence

[Scovill];

by Which

was not relevant.

(R.,

(Id.)

court also ordered that “[t]0 what degree evidence of [Scovill’s] mental state

is

pp.134-

and

[Scovill]

(2)

was

However, the
allowed to be

presented t0 the jury Will largely depend 0n the State’s case and evidence presented of the alleged
crime.” (R., p. 1 37.)

The

A review 0fthe record reveals that the court correctly excluded this evidence.

district court

did not conclude, as the state appeared to argue below, that LC. § 18-

207(1) entirely precludes evidence of a defendant’s mental state where the charged crime
general intent offense.

only

if

it

a

Instead, the court indicated that such evidence could be admissible, but

was probative of

the “willful” or “intentional” nature 0f the conduct that the state

required to prove t0 obtain a conviction for a general intent crime such as battery.

3/28/18 TL, p.18, L.16

is

—

p.19, L.16; p.20, Ls.1-9.)

At

is

(R., p.136;

the hearing, the court stated that “mental

health issues [are] not relevant in

my

unless we’re talking about something that [the

mind

defendant] does completely involuntar[il]y.” (3/28/18 Tr., p.19, Ls.14-16.)
that a defendant’s

mental

state

may be

the possibility that [a defendant]

his

— on

the

body Where he

TL, p.19, Ls.7—1

is

was

The court explained

admissible, for example, if such evidence “goes directly to

acting completely un[-]willfully,

some involuntary action on

unconsciously swinging arms or doing something else.” (3/28/18

Finding n0 such evidence proffered by Scovill or otherwise present in the

1.)

record,4 the court “[could not] see

how

medical history

[Scovill’s]

is

relevant to the issue 0f

Whether [Scovill’ s] actions were Willﬁll and/or his alleged physical contact with the security ofﬁcer

was voluntary and ‘on purpose.”

(R.,

pp.136-137.)

be an offer of proof later on which talks about
completely involuntary,” and that

make

a ruling before

we

give

it

this

how

Still,

the court

acknowledged that “there

at this particular point in

time the actions were

would be something the court would “need

to the jury or exclude

it

may

from the jury.” (3/28/18

t0 100k at

Tr., p.20,

and

Ls.10-

14.)

The

district court further

jurors that Scovill

testimony about

concluded that even though

was having mental health

why

Scovill

issue before the jury.”

was transported

(R., p.137.)

it

would

“likely

be obvious” to the

issues at the time 0f the incident,

t0 the

any speciﬁc

emergency room was “not probative

However, the court also

stated at the hearing that

to

any

“some

background information” would be permissible. (3/28/18 TL, p.19, Ls.17-25.)

4

The district court also referenced testimony from the preliminary hearing indicating that Scovill
“was consciously prepared for a physical altercation With the security ofﬁcer.” (R., p.137.)

10

As the

court district correctly reasoned, even assuming that I.C. § 18-2070) and (3) permit

defendants charged with general intent crimes the opportunity t0 present evidence of their mental
health in

some circumstances, such circumstances

A

are rare.

defendant would have to present

expert testimony that his mental health issues were s0 severe as t0 tend to disprove that he

committed the charged

act

The expert would have

even Willﬁllly 0r intentionally.

to present

testimony indicating that the defendant’s relevant physical acts were truly involuntary, not simply
a product

of,

or inﬂuenced by, a diminished mental capacity

— such

as

someone

acting as a result

0f mental illness—induced agitation 0r confusion.

The Kansas Supreme Court explained how difﬁcult

this

burden

is to

meet

in

m

Pennington, 132 P.3d 902 (2006). Kansas, like Idaho, precludes a defendant from raising a mental
condition as a defense 0f a crime, but permits evidence of a mental disease or defect that negates
the mental state 0f the crime charged. Li. at 907-908; K.S.A. 22-3220. Pennington, like Scovill,

was charged with a general
by excluding

intent crime.

Li. at 908.

his proffered expert testimony that

his intent in the cases at issue

Supreme Court

Pennington argued that the

trial

court erred

he had a “serious delusional disorder” and that

was “formed based on delusional

thinking.”

I_d.

at 913.

The Kansas

rejected Pennington’s argument, concluding:

The problem With this argument is that under the mens rea approach, it is
no longer relevant whether intent is formed rationally or whether it is formed based
on delusions. As the [Kansas] Court of Appeals’ majority correctly recognized,
intent formed 0n the basis of delusions may have provided a defense under the prior
insanity approach, but not under the mens rea approach.
Li. at 908.

11

Applying

this

same general principle,

the district court in the present case properly granted

the state’s motion in limine, both with respect to:

(1)

medical records and medical expert

testimony; and (2) testimony from Scovill’s father or any other defense Witness regarding
Scovill

was transported
There

referenced

by

is

to the

no indication

emergency room.
in the record that the

Scovill in his Witness and exhibit

medical records and medical expert testimony

lists (R.,

whether Scovill’s conduct was willful 0r intentional.
the experts

would be

testifying about

It

pp.99-101, 116-1 18) were relevant to

was unclear even

experts Scovill sought t0 call as witness are in the appellate records

district court to

n0 showing

that

do

to the state

and for What purpose Scovill would be

records. (3/28/1 8 Tr., p.16, Ls.12-24.) Neither the medical records nor

from the

so, Scovill

made no speciﬁc

below what

utilizing the

medical

any information about the

Despite speciﬁc invitation

offer 0f proof.

Therefore, Scovill

any such evidence could meet the exacting standard 0f tending

Scovill’s conduct

Why

to

made

prove that

was involuntary and not merely inﬂuenced by some mental health

issue.

Further, as the district court noted (R., p.137), nothing in the preliminary hearing testimony

indicated that Scovill’s actions were involuntary.

Instead,

preliminary hearing that he took Scovill to the emergency

communicating With him and was anxious and

5

On appeal,

agitated,

Scovill’s father testiﬁed at the

room because

Scovill

and because Scovill’s father suspected

missing portions 0f the record are presumed t0 support the action of the

Rutter V. McLaughlin, 101 Idaho 292, 293, 612 P.2d 135, 136 (1980).

12

had trouble

trial court.

that Scovill

L25;

appeal, in the context of arguing that any error

t0 the court’s determination,

remember
t0

having an adverse reaction to his medication. (Prelim.

Tr., p.48,

L.12 — p.49,

p.52, Ls.3-15.)

On
due

may be

everything,

move past Mr.

he was “not allowed to

was behaving abnormally, was

Albright,

was because he was

was not harmless,
tell

Scovill asserts that

the jury that the reason he can’t

trying to avoid the ofﬁcers, and

suffering

from a mental health

was

trying

crisis at the time.”

(Appellant’s brief, p.24.) While true, none ofthese things are relevant t0 whether Scovill’s charged

actions

were involuntary. Because the record also does not otherwise reﬂect

that

any testimony or

evidence would have met this high standard of tending t0 disprove the requisite general intent of
battery, Scovill has failed to

show

that the district court erred in granting the state’s

motion

to

exclude such testimony.

For similar reasons, the
Scovill

was transported

to the

district court also

emergency room.

properly excluded evidence regarding

Scovill’s father’s preliminary hearing testimony,

as discussed above, does not demonstrate that Scovill’s actions in the

involuntary. Scovill

therefore failed t0

6

Even

made n0

show

offer

Why

ofproof demonstrating

that the district court erred in

emergency room were

that such evidence existed. Scovill has

denying his motion in limine.6

any of the evidence actually proffered by Scovill, or merely inferred from Scovill’s
arguments set forth below, had some relevance With respect to the requisite intent for battery, the
state

if

submits that the probative value of the evidence was so slight that

E

it

was

substantially

I.R.E. 403. The state
outweighed by the danger ofunfair prejudice or 0f confusing the issues.
set forth this alternative ground for exclusion 0fthe evidence at the hearing 0n the motion in limine.

(3/28/18 Tr., p.9, Ls.19-25; p.10, Ls.16-18.)

13

Any Error Was Harmless

D.

Even when

deemed harmless

the

trial

court has abused

if a substantial right is

or in

full,

motion

in limine,

For the reasons discussed above, even

motion

in limine, there is

no indication

this case,

even

does not

if the district court erred, in part

any such error was harmless.

if the district court erred in granting the state’s

different reasonable interpretation 0f LC. § 18-207(3) or

any theoretical expert testimony or other evidence

to disprove the general intent

be

in the record that Scovill actually possessed evidence that

would have been admissible under some
I.R.E. 401. Additionally,

may

0f discretion

error, defect, irregularity or variance that

must be disregarded”). In

in granting the state’s

discretion, such “abuse

not affected.” State V. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 363,

247 P.3d 582, 590 (2010); I.C.R. 52 (“Any
affect substantial rights

its

of battery would have been excluded by

that

may have tended
Which

I.C. § 18-207(4)(a),

requires defendants to provide at least 90 days notice in advance of trial (or such other period as

justice

may

require), that

he intends to raise the issue of mental condition and t0

Witnesses concerning such issue.

The

state raised this issue

of timeliness and improper expert

disclosure t0 the district court and argued, consistently With LC. § 18-207(4)(a), that
to

call expert

an opportunity t0 attempt to locate an expert to rebut such testimony. (3/28/18

it

was

entitled

L.17

Tr., p.6,

-

p.7, L.2; p.16, Ls.12-24.)

Further, as the district court noted (R., p. 1 37; Trial Tr., p. 1 94, Ls. 1 8-19), the jury

aware of the general circumstances surrounding
at the

“gone

time 0f the incident.

why

Scovill

was present

Scovill himself testiﬁed, Without obj ection

to the hospital for a reason.

I

didn’t g0 t0 McDonald’s.”

14

at the

from the

was

likely

emergency room
state, that

he had

(Trial Tr., p.271, Ls.20-25.)

Additionally, there

is

nothing about the

known

room, as testiﬁed about by Scovill’s father

would have

p.49, L.25; p.52, Ls.3-15), that

the evidence of guilt as set forth

by the

reasons for Scovill’s presence at the emergency

at the

preliminary hearing (Prelim. Tr., p.48, L.12

resulted in an acquittal if admitted at

trial in light

—
of

state.

Scovill has failed t0 establish that the district court erred in granting the state’s motion in

limine.

This Court should therefore afﬁrm the

district court’s

determination and Scovill’s

judgment 0f conviction.

II

Has Failed To Demonstrate Either That The Prosecutor Violated I.C.R. 16(b)(6), Or That
The District Court Abused Its Discretion BV Denying His Request T0 Strike Albright’s

Scovill

Testimony
A.

Introduction

Scovill contends that the district court abused

its

discretion

by denying his request to

strike

Albright’s testimony as a sanction for the state’s alleged Violation of I.C.R. 16(b)(6). (Appellant’s
brief, pp.24-28.)

However, a review of the record and applicable law reveals

that Scovill failed t0

establish that the state violated I.C.R. 16(b)(6), or that the district court abused

its

discretion in

declining Scovill’s request for sanctions.

B.

Standard

Of Review

The determination of whether a discovery sanction has occurred,

as well as the decision t0

impose a sanction for a discovery Violation and the choice of an appropriate sanction, are within
the discretion of the

trial court.

State V.

Huntsman, 146 Idaho 580, 586, 199 P.3d 155, 161

15

(Ct.

App. 2008)

(citing State V. Allen, 145

Idaho 183, 185, 177 P.3d 397, 399 (Ct. App. 2008));

State V. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, 104, 175 P.3d 788, 793 (2008).

that discretion is

V.

beyond the purview 0f a reviewing court unless

Stradley, 127 Idaho 203, 208,

899 P.2d 416, 421 (1995)

it

“[T]he

trial

ﬂ alﬂ

court’s exercise 0f

has been clearly abused.”

(citing State V. Buss,

m

98 Idaho 173, 174,

560 P.2d 495, 496 (1977)).
In evaluating Whether a lower court abused

four—part inquiry,

which asks “whether the

its

discretion, the appellate court conducts a

trial court: (1)

discretion; (2) acted Within the outer boundaries

correctly perceived the issue as one 0f

of its discretion;

legal standards applicable t0 the speciﬁc choices available to

it;

(3) acted consistently

and

(4)

reached

its

With the

decision

by the

exercise of reason.” Herrera, 164 Idaho at 272, 429 P.3d at 160 (citing Lunneborg, 163 Idaho at

863, 421 P.3d at 194.

C.

The

District

Court Acted Well Within

Its

Discretion

To Deny

Scovill’s Request

T0

Strike

Albright’s Testimony
Interpretation 0f a court rule

However,

interpretation

must begin with the

of the rule’s language

Court will not interpret a rule in a

way

that

plain, ordinary

may be tempered by the

would produce an absurd

meaning of

purpose of the

its

words.

rule.

The

result. Instead, consistent

With the intent 0f the Idaho Criminal Rules t0 provide for the just determination of every criminal
proceeding, the Court Will construe the rules t0 secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in
administration,

and elimination 0f unjustiﬁable expense and delay.

Montgomery, 163 Idaho 40, 44, 408 P.3d

38,

42 (2017).
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I.C.R.

2(a); State

V.

Idaho Criminal Rule 16 imposes discovery requirements upon the prosecutor.

Idaho

Criminal Rule 16(b)(6) requires a prosecutor t0, upon written request of the defendant, ﬁlmish “the
statements

made by the

prosecution Witness 0r prospective prosecution Witness t0 the prosecuting

attorney or the prosecuting attorney’s agents 0r to any ofﬁcial involved in the investigation of the
case.”

trial.

The purpose of I.C.R. 16

is t0

promote

State V. Morin, 158 Idaho 622, 626,

“When

a party has failed to

fairness

and candor and

349 P.3d 1213, 1217

(Ct.

comply with discovery the

t0 prevent surprise at

App. 2015).

trial

court

may impose

sanctions

including, in appropriate circumstances, the exclusion of a Witness.” State V. Wilson, 158 Idaho

585, 588, 349 P.3d 439, 442 (Ct. App. 2015) (citations omitted). “To determine whether a sanction
will

be imposed and what

culpability

it

will be, the trial court

must weigh the

of the disobedient party with the resulting prejudice

equities, balancing the

t0 the innocent party in light

0f the

twin aims of the sanction power”: “encouraging compliance With discovery and punishing
misconduct.”

Li

(citation omitted).

Demonstrating prejudice in these circumstances “ordinarily

requires that the complaining party demonstrate that the late disclosure

meet the evidence

at trial,

had a deleterious

effect

on

hampered

his trial strategy, or that

the opportunity t0 raise a valid challenge to the admissibility of evidence.”

186, 177 P.3d at

400

it

his ability t0

deprived him of

w,

145 Idaho

at

(citations omitted).

In this case, prior to

trial,

made by prosecution witnesses

Scovill requested, in writing, that the state disclose any statements

or prospective prosecution witnesses t0 the state, and that the state

provide this material 0n a continuing basis Without the necessity 0f further formal requests. (R.,

17

pp.35-37.) In a response, the state informed Scovill that statements

were contained

in the disclosed police report

During the

trial,

— p.162,

L.7.)

made pursuant

moved

disclosed that she

examined Albright outside 0f the

to I.C.R. 16(b)(6).

(Trial Tr., p.159,

In the course of this voir dire, Albright testiﬁed that he

had met With the

prosecutor both prior to and after the preliminary hearing.
Scovill then

(R., pp.44-46.)

prior t0 Albright’s testimony, Scovill

presence 0f the jury to support his objection

L8

of the incident.

made by any known witnesses

t0 exclude Albright’s testimony

met With Albright

(Trial Tr., p.160,

on the ground

after the preliminary hearing.

L.12 — p.162, L.7.)

that the prosecutor

had not

(Trial Tr., p.162, Ls.8-18.) In

response, the prosecutor argued that nothing in Albright’s voir dire testimony indicated that he

made any statements t0 her that were not previously disclosed.
The

district court

denied Scovill’s motion, concluding that

it

or a basis t0 strike the testimony” (Trial Tr., p.166, L.24

(Trial Tr., p.

1

63, L.9

— p. 1 64,

L.4.)

was “not ﬁnding a discovery Violation

— p.167,

L.2),

and

that there

was n0

demonstrated prejudice where Scovill had access to both Albright’s preliminary hearing testimony

and a Video 0f the incident, and Where Albright had not yet testiﬁed inconsistently With either
(Trial Tr., p.165, Ls.1-21).

At

the

trial,

Albright testiﬁed that prior to taking Scovill to the ground, Scovill “hit

[Albright] in the chest With his upper torso.”

(Trial Tr., p.181, Ls.10-12.)

outside the presence 0f the jury, renewed his I.C.R. 16(b)(6) objection

18

Scovill then, again

on the ground

that this

was not a

assertion

p.197, L.24

part 0f Scovill’s preliminary hearing testimony.7 (Trial Tr., p.196, Ls.20-25;

— p.198,

p.198, Ls.2-20.)

L.1.)

The

district court

While the court agreed

declined t0 strike Albright’s testimony.

that Albright’s trial testimony

was

(Trial T11,

different

from

his

preliminary hearing testimony 0n this point, the court found that there was no prejudice because

“we do have
says.8”

the Video t0

(Id.)

Violation.

show

exactly What happened regardless 0f What this 0r any other Witness

The court did not expressly ﬁnd

(E

id.)

Scovill has failed t0

show

that that the prosecutor

committed a discovery

error in the court’s determination because

he has

failed t0 demonstrate that the prosecutor violated I.C.R. 16(b)(6).

Below, Scovill appeared
proven

if a state witness’s

to

be under the impression that a Violation 0f I.C.R. 16(b)(6) was

testimony included facts that were not a part of that witness’s

preliminary hearing testimony, and where the Witness testiﬁed that he had met With the prosecutor

7

made a I.C.R. 16(b)(6) objection to Albright’s testimony (Trial Tr., p.182, Ls.12when he took Scovill t0 the ground, he was concerned about becoming incapacitated and
gaining access to his ﬁrearm, pepper spray, or Taser (Trial Tr., p.218, L.9 — p.219, L.1).

Scovill also

24), that

Scovill

This testimony occurred in the context of Scovill’s description 0f the decision-making process

involved in punching Scovill several times in the face. (Trial
issue appears to have

been resolved

to the satisfaction

Tr., p.

1

82,

L25 — p. 1 83,

L.17.) This

0f the parties and the court when the

state

agreed to only argue t0 the jury that a battery occurred When Scovill struck Albright’s chest with
his torso, before Albright took Scovill to the ground. (Trial Tr., p.219, L.10 — p.222, L.15.) The
prosecutor complied with this order (Trial Tr., p.293, L.13

but the jury was not instructed t0 constrain
initial

confrontation at the door

(ﬂ

its

The Video admitted

(E Appellant’s

into evidence appears to depict Scovill

state agrees

deﬁnitively depict

— p.3 1 0,

L. 1 5),

consideration 0f whether a battery occurred to the

with Scovill’s contention 0n appeal

this.

19

district court’s

brief, pp.24-28.)

making contact with Albright’s chest

With his torso prior t0 Albright taking Scovill to the ground.

However, the

L. 1 5; p.309, L.7

Augmentation). Scovill has not challenged the

determinations regarding this objection on appeal.
8

— p.300,

(State’s Exhibit

(R., p.32), that the

1,

9:10-9:33.)

Video does not

after the preliminary hearing.

While such differences

in testimony

can provide grounds for

impeachment,9 they d0 not alone demonstrate a discovery Violation. Despite conducting voir dire
examinations 0f Albright both prior to (Trial
p.228, Ls.1 1-15), Albright’s

actually

made

p.159, L.12

Even when

him in the

the district court itself

different than

it

was

at the

watched the Video of the incident multiple times

Albright did not

memory 0f the

testify,

(Trial Tr.,

examined Albright prior

Why his memory of the

time of the preliminary hearing

in the interim

incident

that

(Trial T11, p.162, L.19

and was not asked, Whether he expressed

incident to the prosecutor.

-

to

he had

and that his memory “strengthened”

and became “clearer” through conservations with the prosecutor.
L.7.)

and during

chest with his upper torso prior t0

Albright’s testimony, Albright provided only an explanation as to

may have been somewhat

L.7),

Speciﬁcally, Scovill never elicited testimony regarding Whether

or not Albright told the prosecutor that Scovill struck

taking Scovill t0 the ground.

— p.162,

testimony, Scovill never established what statements Albright

trial

t0 the prosecutor.

Tr.,

details

— p.163,

0f his clearer

Scovill thus failed to demonstrate that the prosecutor

violated I.C.R. 16(b)(6).
Further, even if some degree 0f disclosure of the relevant statement t0 the prosecutor could

be inferred from the circumstances, a comparison of Scovill’s preliminary hearing testimony with
his jury trial testimony reveal that Albright’s accounts

0f the incident were not inconsistent, and

9

Scovill, in fact, thoroughly impeached Albright 0n asserted differences and additions made
between preliminary hearing testimony and jury trial testimony. (Trial Tr., p.191, L.3 — p.192,

L.7; p.203, L.21

— p.210,

L.4 — p.233, L. 10.) Albright explained that multiple viewings
“a clearer understanding 0f What happened.” (Trial TL, p.205, Ls.8—

L.4; p.23

of the Video had given him

1,

12.)

20

thus did not prejudice Scovill.

As

Scovill emphasizes

0n appeal (Appellant’s

brief, pp.24-26),

Albright testiﬁed at the preliminary hearing that he “[doesn’t] have t0 wait to be punched before

can take use force — or use use 0f force,” (Prelim TL, p.19, L.23 — p.20, L.1), implying that

[he]

Scovill did not “punch”

trial,

him before Albright took him down. However,

at the

subsequent jury

Albright did not contradict this testimony by, for example, asserting that Scovill “punched”

him prior t0 Albright taking

Scovill

down. Further, While

not speciﬁcally describe Scovill hitting

him

at the

preliminary hearing, Albright did

in the chest with his

response t0 a cross—examination question about

Why

upper

he did

torso,

testify, in

he would “hit somebody in the face With a

closed ﬁst,” that Scovill “physically attacked [him].” (Prelim Tr., p.20, Ls.18-24.) Albright also

disagreed with Scovill’s counsel’s characterization 0n cross—examination that Albright was the one

Who

physically attacked Scovill.

(Prelim Tr., p.20, L.25

Albright’s preliminary hearing and jury

even

if a

trial

—

p.21, L.5.)

The

testimony were not so stark as t0 establish prejudice

discovery Violation were established.

Additionally, even had Albright established a discovery Violation,

discretion for the court t0 decline to

testimony in a felony battery case.

“hampered
or.

.

differences between

his ability t0

.deprived

E m,

145 Idaho

meet the evidence

at 186,

was not an abuse of

impose the harsh sanction of the exclusion of the Victim’s

Scovill did not attempt to argue

him 0f the opportunity

it

at trial,

had a deleterious

how any
effect

lack 0f disclosure

on

his trial strategy,

t0 raise a valid challenge t0 the admissibility

177 P.3d

at

400.

Nor

is

there

any indication

0f evidence.”

in the record that the

prosecutor intended any discovery Violation, Which limits the “culpability 0f the disobedient

power” and the need

t0 “punish misconduct.”

m
21

Wilson, 158 Idaho

at

588, 349 P.3d at 442.

Scovill has failed t0 demonstrate that the district court erred in declining to strike Albright’s

testimony because he failed t0 establish either that the prosecutor violated I.C.R. 16(b)(6), or that

he was prejudiced from any such Violation. This Court should therefore afﬁrm the

district court’s

determination and the judgment 0f conviction.

III.

Scovill

Scovill

constitutional

pp.28-29.)

themselves,

asserts

that

Has Failed T0 Demonstrate Error To Cumulate
even

if the

errors

he alleges were individually harmless, his

due process rights were violated by the accumulation 0f errors. (Appellant’s

“Under the doctrine 0f cumulative

error, a series

may in the aggregate show the absence

t0 the application

of the doctrine

is

of a

fair trial.

of

errors,

brief,

harmless in and of

However, a necessary predicate

a ﬁnding of more than one error.” State V. Parker, 157 Idaho

132, 149, 334 P.3d 806, 823 (2014) (quoting State V. Per_ry, 150 Idaho 209, 230, 245 P.3d 961,

982 (2010)). Because Scovill has

failed to

case. Therefore, Scovill’s cumulative error

show any
argument

22

error, there is

fails.

n0

error to cumulate in this

CONCLUSION
The
Scovill’s

state respectfully requests this

Court t0 afﬁrm the

district court’s

determinations and

judgment 0f conviction.

DATED this 21st day of January, 2020.
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